Assessing the risk from the depleted uranium weapons used in Operation
  Allied Force by Liolios, Theodore E.
ar
X
iv
:p
hy
sic
s/9
90
40
61
v2
  [
ph
ys
ics
.m
ed
-p
h]
  1
8 D
ec
 19
99
Assessing the risk from the depleted Uranium weapons used in Operation
Allied Force.
T.E.Liolios †‡1
†Department of Theoretical Physics,University of Thessaloniki,Thessaloniki 54006,Greece
‡Hellenic War College, BST 903, Greece
Abstract
The conflict in Yugoslavia has been a source of great concern due to the radiological and
toxic hazard posed by the alleged presence of depleted uranium in NATO weapons. In the
present study some worst-case scenaria are assumed in order to assess the risk for Yugoslavia
and its neighboring countries . The risk is proved to be negligible for the neighboring
countries while for Yugoslavia itself evidence is given that any increase in total long-term
cancer mortality will be so low that it will remain undetected. Local radioactive hotspots
such as DU weapons fragments and abandoned battle tanks, fortified or contaminated with
DU, constitute a post-war hazard which is not studied in this article.
1.Introduction
Operation Allied Force (OAF) has been going on for weeks2 in Yugoslavia , employ-
ing sophisticated weapons that carry the spectrum of radiological contamination. Over
the past decades there has been a tremendous effort in weapons laboratories to use de-
pleted uranium (DU) in conventional weapons in order to enhance their penetrability or
to strengthen armor panels (tanks, artillery etc.). Depleted uranium is used in a num-
ber of armor-piercing anti-tank munitions, such as those aboard American A-10 Warthog
jets, Apache helicopters, and M-1 Abrams and Bradley tanks. US. and Allied forces fired
approximately 315 tons of depleted uranium[1] during the Persian Gulf War. Yugoslav
state news media have referred to ”radioactive bombs” being launched by NATO. There
is strong likelihood that the weapons referred to are composed of depleted uranium (DU).
Its ability to self-sharpen as it penetrates armor is the main reason why tungsten, which
tends to mushroom upon impact, has been abandoned. Nevertheless, the high temperatures
caused by the high explosives (HE) detonated in the weapon or the friction between the
ammunition and the target (armor, concrete....) lead to the generation of uranium oxides
which along with the tiny fragments of the weapon case pose a serious radiological hazard
to living beings. So far no measurement has shown any increase in the environmental ra-
dioactivity either in Yugoslavia or in Greece. As for Yugoslavia, one has to rely on the local
scientific community to detect and assess the contamination. However, as there has been
severe censorship on every sort of information by the Serbs, and most likely by the NATO
officials, the international scientific community should independently attempt to reliably
assess the possible implications of DU that have allegedly been dropped in the Balkans.
Until some counter detects the contamination the only means available are theoretical haz-
ard predictions through computer simulations . By applying a worst case scenario, an
1email:theoliol@physics.auth.gr
2The present work was submitted to Science & Global Security during Operation Allied Force. Refereed
and accepted for publication
1
initial emergency assessment , or safety analysis planning is possible. Although, precise
data about the performance and the composition of these weapons are classified, in a worst
case scenario one can use the available unclassified data which can still yield the magnitude
of the hazard and trigger an appropriate emergency planning and response. In the present
work a very reliable computer code has been used which simulates explosions where nuclear
material is involved. The code is ”HOTSPOT”[2] produced by S.G.Homann at Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory . It is a very effective Gaussian plume model suitable for
radiation risk assessments at short and large distances from the source. Moreover the fa-
miliar wedge model[3] is applied in order to predict average total long-term cancer fatalities
caused by DU inhalation. Throughout the present work basic information is given about
fundamental radiological properties or weapons compositions. This is imperative as the
results presented here are expected to be of interest to non-experts, as well.
2.NATO weapons overview in OAF.
A thorough analysis of the weapons used by NATO against Serbia[4] indicates that some
of them are specially designed to penetrate hard targets . Despite the fact that the precise
data for those weapons are classified there are some very strong arguments that indicate
the presence of DU in their composition.
a) Yugoslav state news media have referred to ”radioactive bombs” being launched by
NATO [5].
b) The Tomahawk currently in use is Tomahawk Block III with improved target pene-
tration [6]. The only material that can improve target penetration nowadays is DU.
c) No data exist about the precise composition of the Tomahawk high density penetrator
which raises an eyebrow about the motives of this secrecy.
However, its warhead must be either a kinetic energy penetrator or a multiple warhead
system (MWS) [7] with an approximate weight of 400 kg (plus 50 kg of HE). In either
case, penetration performance depends on the weight per cross sectional area of the follow-
through warhead. That means that a very heavy metal has to be used in its composition
to maximize target penetration.
Some very penetrating weapons used in the current war are [9]:
Tomahawk missile. An all-weather submarine or ship launched land-attack missile.
It is used to attack a variety of hard fixed targets , which explains why the missile has to
be extremely penetrating (which makes it a DU suspect). During the war in the Gulf, 288
missiles where fired (II generation) while so far hundreds (III generation and probably some
experimental of the IV generation ) are believed to have struck targets in Serbia and Kosovo.
That highly sophisticated weapons carries a single conventional warhead or submunitions.
The BGM-109 model weighs 1192 kg, has a length of 5.56 m, and a diameter of 51.8 cm
( without the booster ). A rough estimate of the typical weight of its airframe is 400 kg
[10]. Besides, in the same category we have to include the Air Force’s Conventional Air
Launched Cruise Missile CALCM . CALCM used to carry nuclear warheads and has been
converted to conventional weapons. Its frame may have been fortified with DU to withstand
the blast of anti-missile defences of the FUSSR. In any case, in a worst-case scenario, cruise
missiles must be considered DU carriers. The positive aspect of that weapon is that sample
fragments of its casing, scattered in the vicinity of the explosion, may reveal its composition.
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BLU-107 Durandal .The Durandal anti-runway bomb was developed by the French
company MATRA, designed solely for the purpose of destroying runways. Once the parachute
retarded low-level drop bomb attains a nose-down attitude, it fires a rocket booster that
penetrates the runway surface, and a delayed explosion buckles a portion of the runway. It
can penetrate up to 40 centimeters of concrete, creating a 200 square meter crater causing
damage more difficult to repair than the crater of a general-purpose bomb.
BLU-109/B. The BLU-109/B (I-2000) is an improved 2,000-pound-class bomb de-
signed as a penetrator without a forward fuze well. Its configuration is relatively slim, and
its skin is much harder than that of the standard MK-84 bomb. The skin is a single-piece,
forged warhead casing of one-inch, high-grade steel. Its usual tail fuze is a mechanical-
electrical FMU- 143. The 1,925-pound bomb has a 550-pound tritonal high-explosive blast
warhead
Guided Bomb Unit-28 (GBU-28). The Guided Bomb Unit-28 (GBU-28) is a special
weapon developed for penetrating hardened command centers located deep underground.
The GBU-28 is a 5,000-pound laser-guided conventional munition that uses a 4,400-pound
penetrating warhead. The bombs are modified Army artillery tubes, weigh 4,637 pounds,
and contain 630 pounds of high explosives.
AGM-114 Hellfire II. Laser Hellfire presently is used as the main armament of the
U.S. Army’s AH-64 Apache and US. Marine Corps’s AH-1W Super Cobra helicopters. For
antiarmor roles, the AGM-114 missile has a conical shaped charge warhead with a copper
liner cone that forms the jet that provides armor penetration. This high explosive, antitank
warhead is effective against various types of armor including applique and reactive. Actual
penetration performance is classified.
The PGU-14/B API ammunition. That Armor Piercing Incendiary round has a
lightweight body which contains a sub-calibre high density penetrator of Depleted Uranium
(DU). In addition to its penetrating capability DU is a natural pyrophoric material which
enhances the incendiary effects. It is used by the AN/GAU-8 30mm Avenger ( a 30mm
seven-barrel gatling gun, mounted only on the A-10 attack jet, used primarily in the air to
ground role as a soft target killer and tank buster) and also by the M230 automatic gun
mounted on the Apache helicopter.
M256 120mm smoothbore cannon. It is the main weapon of the M1A1 battle
tank. The primary armor-defeating ammunition of this weapon is the armor-piercing,
fin-stabilized, discarding sabot (APDS-FS) round, which features a depleted uranium pen-
etrator. Battle tanks have not been used yet by the NATO forces, therefore that scenario
is not studied for the time being.
In our study we will focus our simulation on the Tomahawk missiles, the BLU-109 bomb
and the API ammunition, as not only do they represent well our worst case scenaria but
also the available unclassified information suffices for our risk assessment approach. Note
that the bomblet dispersion version of Tomahawk is not expected to have an improved
penetration capability and therefore our models will focus on the single warhead version.
3. A short description of DU
Depleted uranium[11] is the metallic remnant of a series of processes the uranium ore
undergoes and it is roughly 60 percent as radioactive as naturally occurring uranium. On
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the other hand, Uranium, a radioactive element, is a silver-white metal in its pure form.
It is a heavy metal nearly twice as dense as lead
(
19 gr
cm3
)
compared with
(
11.4 gr
cm3
)
. On
average, each of us takes in 1.9µg (0.65× 10−6µCi) of uranium a day from food and water,
and inhales a very small fraction 7×10−3µg (2.3× 10−9µCi) every day. In nature Uranium
is composed of three isotopes (each has its own unique decay process emitting some form
of ionizing radiation:alpha, beta, gamma radiation or a combination) in the following ratio:
NATURAL URANIUM COMPOSITION
234
92
U (0.0054%) ,235
92
U (0.7%) ,238
92
U (99.3%)
In the gaseous diffusion process two fractions are produced in the form of UF6 : one
enriched in 235U and the other depleted in 235U. The former is further processed to give
weapons-grade Uranium (WgU) whereas the latter is chemically transformed by weapons
manufacturers into Uranium metal and alloys, suitable for ammunition and armor panels.
In fact, DU has a low content of 234U, and 235U which have been removed in the depletion
process. Therefore the product and by-product of the enrichment are respectively [12]:
WEAPON-GRADE URANIUM COMPOSITION
234
92
U (1%) ,235
92
U (93.5%) ,238
92
U (5.5%)
DEPLETED URANIUM COMPOSITION
235
92
U (0, 2%) ,238
92
U (99, 8%)
After the enrichment process DU can used as a fusion tamper in the thermonuclear
weapons. The fusion tamper prevents the escape of thermal radiation from the thermonu-
clear fuel thus enhancing the burn efficiency. Moreover, fast neutrons ( 2.45MeV and
14.1MeV ) from the fusion processes fission the DU tamper. This extra boost accounts for
half the yield of a fission-fusion-fission nuclear bomb [13].
The most important constituent of DU is 238
92
U , an alpha emitter with a half-life of
4.5× 109 years and a specific activity of 3.4× 10−7Ci
gr
(while the isotope 235U has a specific
activity of 2.2× 10−6Ci
gr
). The total combined specific activity of DU is 4.76 × 10−7Ci
gr
[14].
It has two short-lived daughters :(234Th, half-life of 24.1 days) and (234Pa, half-life of 1.17
minutes) which are beta and weak gamma emitters. Because of this constant nuclear decay
process, very small amounts of these ”daughters” are always present in DU. On the other
hand 235U (half-life 7× 108 years) decays into 231Pa (half-life 3.25× 104 years), which is an
alpha, beta, and gamma ray emitter. The 238U and 235U chains continue through a series
of long-lived isotopes before terminating in stable, non-radioactive lead isotopes 206Pb and
207Pb. Note that regardless of its size (large fragments or small particles), once entering
the body, DU is subject to various degrees of solubilization-it dissolves in bodily fluids,
which act as a solvent. Its main toxic effects are cellular necrosis and renal failure. The
American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH) has established a
Threshold Limit Value (TLV ) [15]of 0.2mg
m3
(for both soluble and insoluble compounds).
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TLVs are based on the principle that there is a threshold below which no adverse health
effects occur and are called time-weighted-average values because they are averaged over
an 8-hour workday, for a 40-hour workweek over a working lifetime. Though TVLs were
developed for the working environment , in the battlefield or in emergency planning they
can still give a measure of the risk.
4.DU cancer risk
DU is radioactive and therefore carcinogenic. The principal hazard from exposure to DU
aerosols is an increased probability of cancer of the lung and of other organs where the DU
oxides are transported. While it is difficult to calculate the total immediate radiation effects
on health in terms of exact doses to specific individuals, we can we resort to the ”wedge
model” [16]in order to compute the average total long-term man-rem doses. According to
this model, the total amount (I) of DU inhaled, as a result of a given release, is : I =
Qbpu−1,where Q the total amount of DU released, b the breathing rate[17], p the average
population density and u the deposition velocity. If we make the assumption that the risk is
linear with dose then we can combine the committed effective dose equivalent (CEDE )[18]
for 238U inhaled (1.2× 108 rem
Ci
) with the ICRP cancer risk factor ( 5× 10−4 cancers
rem
) [19] to
estimate cancer risks from DU inhalation with respect to population densities and deposition
velocities. The results are shown in Figure 1.
5. Simulation of Tomahawk attacks .
5.1 The wedge model predictions
In the present work we will limit our discussion in the conventional use of DU as this
is currently employed in Yugoslavia. It is common sense that most of the attacks against
industrial facilities , bridges and government buildings need weapons with enhanced pen-
etrability. That need spells the name of DU. Such is also the case for anti-tank munition,
anti-radar bombs or weapons which destroy the runways of airports. The most infamous
weapon is the Tomahawk missile used day after day by the NATO alliance.
Being consistent with our worst case scenario we assume that the kinetic energy war-
head of the Tomahawk missile is made of 400 kg of DU. Therefore, we have an activity of
0.192Ci per missile. After the impact only a small quantity will constitute the respirable
fraction-defined as the fraction of the released material associated with an Activity Me-
dian Aerodynamic Diameter (AMAD) of 1µm. The default ICRP-30[19] internal dosimetry
conversion factors also assume an AMAD particle-size distribution of 1µm. During the ex-
plosion a temperature of 5000 0C is reached [20] which exceeds the boiling point of Uranium
(4700 0C). That temperature will produce a large quantity of DU aerosols in the form of
Uranium Oxides that may find their way into the respiratory tract.
The previous analysis of the wedge model can be used to predict maximum cancer
lethality per missile. Assuming an attack in a densely populated urban area (3000 km−2),
we have approximately one cancer per Tomahawk missile. That is the total long-term
lethality per missile assuming that all the DU carried becomes respirable, which of course
is a worst-case scenario showing the maximum potential of a Tomahawk to cause cancer.
(Note that the media speak of several hundreds of such missiles fired against Yugoslavia
during Operation Allied Force).
5.2. The Gaussian model predictions
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The default respirable fraction of 20% in a uranium explosion, used in the HOTSPOT,
is indeed a realistic scenario to assess immediate risks, particularly at short distances. That
being the case, each Tomahawk is supposed to carry a respirable radioactivity of 38 mCi
missile
.
To realize the magnitude of that activity, a typical radioactive quantity injected into a
patient in a thyroid function test is 10µCi that is approximately 3800 times less. On the
other hand a typical amount of radioactivity released in a large scale reactor accident is
108Ci, [24]that is approximately 26× 108 more. The non-respirable fraction which consists
of fragments scattered in the vicinity of the explosion, and particles much larger than 1µm
will be ignored in the rest of this study though the are highly toxic and will definitely be
localized and contaminate the vicinity of the explosion. Nor will we discuss the aggravation
of lethality due to open wound or injuries during the rescue operations.
Of course during the explosion the distribution of the radioactive DU is governed by
such factors as wind speed, amount of explosives , deposition velocity and so on that will
further reduce the lethality of the missile.
In the model of this study we make the assumption that a single Tomahawk strike
is actually a 400 kg DU explosion which involves the detonation of 50 kg of HE. The
release fraction is 20% ( that is the percentage of the warhead that can be inhaled after
the explosion[21]) and the wind speed is assumed to be 8 m
sec
. The time of day is night
(stability class D) , while the deposition velocity is 1 cm
sec
. Note that the cloud effective heights
calculated by HOTSPOT agree well with the experimental data for detonations of similar
yields[22].The ”HOTSPOT” calculations yield the 50-years CEDEs (due to inhalation as
the ground shine is negligible compared to plume effects) and the ground deposition of
radioactivity at various distances (Figure 2., 3.).
Distance (km) 0.1 0.2 0.5 1 2 5 10 20 50 75 100
50-year CEDE (mrem) 4.8 3.9 2.6 1.7 1.0 0.5 0.26 0.13 0.046 0.029 0.021
Ground depos.
(
10−3 µCi
m2
)
38 31 20 13 7.8 3.5 1.7 0.71 0.18 0.09 0.06
If we take into account that the current established protection standards are:[23]
a) 5 rems in a year for workers (to protect against cancer).
b) 50 rems in a year for workers to any organ (to protect against threshold
effects, such as radiation burns, etc.).
c) 50 rems in a year to the skin or to any extremity.
d) 15 rems in a year to the lens of the eye (to protect against cataracts).
e) 0.1 rem in a year (70-year lifetime) for members of the public.
we come to the conclusion that people who are as close as 100m at the time of the
explosion are expected to receive, over a period of 50 years after the explosion, 20 times less
than the maximum allowed dose per year. Needles to say, at distances larger than 20 km
the doses are negligible. Of course, at close distances, the results of the blast wave will be
devastating and will prevail over any other effect.
The ground deposition, on the other hand, reaches the concentration of 0.038µCi
m2
at a
distance of 100m where we have to remember that a concentration of 2µCi
m2
is needed for
land to be rendered unsuitable for cultivation[26], that is almost 50 times more.
To underline the impossibility of DU radiological contamination for the neighboring
countries of Yugoslavia, we can assume that 1000 such attacks are made against targets in
6
Pristina in Northern Kosovo. That would cause a 50-CEDE of 0.046 rem at a distance of
50 km. Note that a CT exam administers a dose of 1.1rem (head and body). If we rotate
the isodose downwind radius of the Gaussian model to cover all possible wind directions,
then a circular spot is produced which indicates the area at risk according to the present
model (Figure 4). Outside the borders of that circular area the plume is not expected to
deliver a dose higher than that of a pelvis x-ray.
6. Simulation of BLU-109/B bomb attacks.
In that model , consistent with our worst case scenario, we also assume that the warhead
of the bomb is made of DU . In that case we have the explosion of 651 kg of DU with 243
kg of HE. Therefore assuming the use of a quantity of 1000 BLU-109/B against targets
in Pristina and the same conditions as in the Tomahawk case we obtain a 50-CEDE of
0.06 rem at a distance of 50 km. The combined CEDE of Tomahawks and BLUs would still
be low: 0.1rem (less than a lumbar spinal x-ray).In fact, if such was the case then those
attacks would have dropped some 1000 tons (200 respirable tons) of DU in Yugoslavia when
according to the Iraqi authorities the war in the Gulf left 315 tons of DU in Iraq.
7. DU of the PGU-14/B API and the APDS-FS rounds .
A typical combat load for the GAU-8 gun is 1,100 30 mm rounds. Each round con-
tains 330gr of DU , alloyed with 0.75weight percent titanium. The projectile is encased
in 0.8mm-thick aluminum shell as the final DU round[27], preventing any escape of the
a−radiation emitted.. Consequently each round carries approximately 1.5× 10−4Ci.Upon
impact, the shell is subject to high temperatures due to friction with the armor panel. More-
over, if the armored vehicle explodes or is set on fire then the respirable activity produced
by the armor panel should also be taken into account. For example, the Abrams battle
tank’s thicker armor is reinforced at the turret and flanks by DU panels inserted between
regular steel armor. Another source of DU is the primary armor-defeating ammunition of
the M256 120mm smoothbore cannon (main weapon of the M1A1 battle tank), which is an
armor-piercing, fin-stabilized, discarding sabot round. It is imperative that battle tanks,
attacked by NATO forces in Yugoslavia, are closely examined for radioactive traces. Note
that the DU rounds always leave a distinctive radioactive trace on the entrance and exit
holes. Each time an A10 unloads its gun, 360 kg of DU will be released in the environment.
Assuming that an A10 unloads its gun on every mission and that the whole DU quantity
becomes respirable (worst case scenario) , the wedge model can be used to predict total
long-term cancer fatalities per mission (Figure 5). As the average population of Yugoslavia
is 100 km−2 it turns out that it would take roughly fifty A-10 missions to have an additional
cancer death. Although a commander would strive to deploy his troops as sparsely as pos-
sible, in the theater of operations the average population density of ground forces can reach
urban area levels (300 km−2 to 3000 km−2) . As a result in the battlefield cancer risk is
expected to be higher. If we assume for the people of Yugoslavia an individual cancer death
risk similar to that of the US. (i.e., 20%), then 5000 such attacks would increase individual
cancer risk by 10−5. That increase would remain undetected against the large background.
Of course, it is very unlikely that such a number of attacks has occurred so far.
8. The Hellfire case. Due to its low yield and weight (warhead weighs less than 10
kg) any risk associated with that weapon will be much less significant than the Tomahawk
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scenario risk. If the classified composition of its armor-piercing structure is indeed DU ,
then it is expected to pose a hazard only to people at very close distances, especially during
” battle tank fires”. Since no reliable data exist and no use of the weapon in question has
been made yet in Kosovo, any assumption might further complicate the current situation.
9. Chemical toxicity of DU.
The toxic risk can be assessed by means of a simple model without knowing details
of the population over which it is dispersed and the meteorological conditions. Suppose
that 1000 tons of respirable DU is dispersed uniformly over Greece which has an area of
132.000 km2 . We assume that all the aerosols have been concentrated in a volume with
1km height. This gives a concentration of 7.5× 10−3mg
m3
, which is about 26 times less than
the threshold limit value. A similar calculation yields an air concentration of 0.04mg
m3
for
FYROM[28] which should not cause much concern either.
The lifetime of the toxic cloud depends on the height and the rate at which the parti-
cles fall out. A deposition velocity of 1 cm
sec
is very plausible[29] while particles larger than
1µmwill fall faster. Rain or moisture will increase that velocity. In that scenario, particles
from the top of the cloud will take 27 hours to reach the ground. It is very unlikely that
the cloud will remain over a city for that long. Even a light breeze (5 m
sec
) will carry the
cloud beyond a large city (the size of Athens) in a few hours.
Of course an actual toxic cloud is not expected to have the above shape but the present
model gives solid evidence that the fear of toxic poisoning, due to DU that is allegedly used
in the present war, is groundless. Note that the amount of DU that could be inhaled is
independent of the height and the extend of the cloud as shown in a similar study that
disproved exaggerated allegations about Plutonium risks[30].
That absolutely worst-case scenaria show that there is no immediate hazard from the
radiological or chemical toxicity of DU for the neighboring countries of Yugoslavia. Ad-
mittedly, localized DU can enter the food chain and reach inhabitants of other countries
by means of exported goods or river streams. However, such aspects are regarded as less
harmful than actual inhalation of the DU plume.
10.Conclusions.
We have assumed some worst-case scenaria in order to assess the radiological and chem-
ical risk of the alleged use of DU in OAF, for Yugoslavia and its neighboring countries. For
the time being, the risk for the neighboring countries is found to be negligible , while for the
people of Yugoslavia itself, evidence is given that any increase in average total, long-term
cancer mortality will be so low that it will remain undetected.
The use of the PGU-14/B API ammunition seems to be the most hazardous weapon
used daily in the theater of operations as is openly declared a DU carrier. Its use so far
has been limited to the Avenger gun of the A-10 jet. If Apache helicopters move in, the
effects will escalate and need further investigation. On the other hand, accurate data about
the composition of the weapons used in OAF are needed in order to accurately predict the
radiological and chemical contamination of DU at very close distances, especially in order
to investigate the formation of radioactive hotspots. Such data could be either obtained by
the NATO authorities or by studying the fragments of the weapons in question (Tomahawk
missiles, BLU bombs etc.) scattered in the vicinity of the explosion. Once DU is detected,
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the above simulations can be fed with more accurate data in order to perform a precise risk
assessment in the area.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The author would like to thank S.Homann for providing his code HOTSPOT, as well
as H.Feiveson, S.Fetter, K.Ypsilantis and A.Petkou for useful comments and discussion.
The present work was inspired by an article which used the same risk assessment models
in order to study the hazards from Plutonium dispersal accidents[31].
The author is grateful to C.Zerefos for valuable information and advice on the post-war
environmental hazards in Yugoslavia.
References
[1] FAS,Military Analysis Network, maintained by John Pike:
http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/
[2] S.Homann, ”HOTSPOT”, Health Physics Codes for the PC, Lawrence Livermore Na-
tional Laboratory, UCLR-MA-106315, (1994)
[3] ”Report to the APS by the study group on light-water reactor safety”, Rev.Mod.Phys.,
Vol. 47, Suppl.No 1., 1975
[4] FAS, op.cit.
[5] Report broadcast on MSNBC, April 1
[6] GAO/NSIAD-95-116, ”Cruise Missiles”, Chapter Report, 04/20/95
[7] Mark Hewish, Janes International Defence Review, 1/1998
[8] FAS, op.cit.
[9] FAS, op.cit.
[10] K.Tsipis, Scientific American, 20 (236) 1977
[11] Environmental Exposure Report, US DoD, http://www.gulflink.osd.mil/du/
[12] S.Fetter, Science and Global Security, 225 (1) 1990
[13] K.Tsipis. ”Understandig weapons in the nuclear age”, (1983), ISBN 0-671-44073-X,
Simon & Schuster inc.
[14] S.Homann, op. cit.
[15] 1998 TLVs and BEIs, Threshold Limit Values for Chemical Substances and Physical
Agents, Biological Exposure Indices, American Conference of Governmental Industrial
Hygienists
9
[16] ”Report to the APS by the study group on light-water reactor safety” op.cit.
[17] 1m3/hr for an adult performing a light activity
[18] Commited Effective Dose Equivalent is a weighted sum of organ dose equivalents mul-
tiplied by appropriate risk weighting factor. It stands for the total dose a person is
commited to receive as the result of an intake of radioactive materials during the
50-year period after the intake.
[19] International Commission on Radiological Protection (1979), ICRP Publication 30,
Part1, Vol.2, No. 3/4, Pergamon Press, NY.
[20] E.J.Kansa,LLNL, UCRL-ID-128733
[21] In fact an additional fraction of the actual plume is expected to be confined inside the
structure where the warhead explodes. Therefore our scenario remains consistently a
worst-case one.
[22] E.J.Kansa, op.cit.
[23] Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 20, Standards for Protection Against Ra-
diation, Subpart C, 20.1201: Occupational Dose Limits for Adults; and Subpart D,
20.1301, Dose Limits for Individual Members of the Public
[24] Steve Fetter and Kosta Tsipis, Scientific American, Vol. 244, No. 4 (April 1981)
[25] International Commission on Radiological Protection , ICRP Publication 60 (Perga-
mon Press, Oxfordm UK, 1991)
[26] K.Tsipis,op.cit
[27] FAS, op. cit.
[28] Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Greece has not officialy recognised FYROM
by the name Macedonia.
[29] S.Homann, op. cit.
[30] W.G.Sutcliffe at al, LLNL, UCRL-JC-118825
[31] S.Fetter and F.Von Hippel, Science and Global Security 21 (2) 1990
10
